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 1 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the operation of an Islamic Inter-bank Money Market (IIMM), 
within a dual banking system. The paper argues that even though an Islamic money 
market operates in an interest-free environment and trades Shariah-compliant 
instruments, many of the risks associated with conventional money markets, including 
interest-rate risks are relevant.  
 
The empirical evidence, based on Malaysian data, points to Islamic money market 
profit rates/yields that are highly correlated and move in tandem with conventional 
money market rates. Given the dynamics of fund flows and cross-linkages, an IIMM 
operating within a dual banking system cannot sterilize itself from interest-rate risks. 
 
 In fact, the paper argues that such an IIMM may actually enhance interest-rate risk 
transmission to the Islamic banking sector, by providing additional channels of 
transmission. Ironical as it may be, the operations of an IIMM in a dual banking 
system may serve to bring the Islamic banking sector into closer orbit with the 
conventional sector.  
 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction  
 When Islamic banking was being introduced in Malaysia in the 1980’s, the 
basic strategy was one of replication, essentially transforming the sources and 
application of funds of conventional banks into Islamically acceptable products. Thus, 
on the liability side, savings and current accounts became Al-Wadiah accounts, 
whereas fixed deposits became Mudarabah General Investment Accounts.  
 
On the asset side, short-term loans were redesigned as Murabaha financing, while 
medium and long-term loans as Bai al Bithaman Ajil (BBA). This strategic choice of 
moving on the path of least resistance has been a success. Islamic banking has 
obviously taken root in Malaysia. Having grown at an annual average in excess of 
50%, over the last decade, it now accounts for approximately 10% of the country’s 
total banking sector. As an order of magnitude, total deposits within the Islamic 
banking sector was one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) in 1994. This level of growth is 
impressive by any measure. 
 This outstanding growth performance owes much to the initiative of 
Malaysia’s central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), in particular BNM’s 
initiative in establishing the Islamic Inter-bank Money Market (IIMM) in January 
1994. The ability to access a money market with Shari’ah compliant products, 
effectively unplugged the major bottleneck to growth, and the inability of Islamic 
banks to manage asset-liability mismatches. The near one-hundred-fold1 increase in 
market share of Islamic Banks (IBs) since 1994 is probably attributable to the 
presence of a well functioning money market.  
 
                                                 
1
 Percent of deposits in IBs which stood at 0.1% in January 1994 have now come close to 10% of total. 
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Despite this success, however, many challenges remain. As an Islamic Money Market 
functioning within a dual banking system, it is in many ways operating in uncharted 
waters. There is little precedence or experience to draw upon.
 
This paper examines the issues and challenges that face an Islamic Inter-bank Money 
Market that operates within a dual banking system. The paper will argue that even 
though an Islamic Money Market operates in an interest-free environment and trades 
Shari’ah compliant instruments, many of the risks associated with conventional 
money markets, including interest-rate risks, are relevant to Islamic Money Markets 
operating in a dual banking system.  
 
The paper is divided into five parts. Section 2 below, describes Malaysia’s Islamic 
Inter-bank Money Market (IIMM). Section 3, examines some of the key risks 
associated with money market functions. In section 4, an empirical examination of the 
extent to which yields in the IIMM are correlated with conventional money market 
yields is undertaken. The implication of this on interest-rate exposure for the Islamic 
financial sector is discussed. Section 5 looks at some of the challenges and 
conclusions.  
 
Malaysia’s Islamic Inter-bank Money Market (IIMM) 
 The money market is a key appendage of the banking system. Banks depend 
on the money market to manage their liquidity. While liquidity management is not the 
only use of money markets for banks, it is by far the most important. In fact, banks 
depend upon and dominate the money market so much, that often they are known as 
the Inter-bank Money Market. The Inter-bank Money Market is no different from the 
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money market, only that it is bank dominated. With the exception of the US, where 
the money market is Securities Dominated, with funds being channeled through use of 
short-term securities such as Treasury bills and commercial papers, most money 
markets, including Malaysia’s are bank-dominated. In bank dominated money 
markets, funds are moved through use of bank deposit instruments such as Banker’s 
Acceptances (BAs) and Certificates of Deposit (CDs)  
Given the links that the money market has with both the capital market and the 
banking system, it has become the ideal avenue for central banks to conduct monetary 
operations. As such, the first impact of a monetary policy change is always felt first in 
the money market. It is the short interest rate/yield, derived from money market 
trading, that first responds to central-bank policy implementation.  
Adjustment in the bond-cum-equity market and banking system follow the money 
market reaction. Thus, a well functioning money market properly transmits policy 
initiatives to the rest of the financial system. Occasionally, central banks may also use 
the money market for credit allocation purpose.  While the money markets of 
developed nations evolved from the correspondent banking system of the early days, 
Malaysia’s money market - like its Islamic counterpart, the IIMM - were established 
by fiat, i.e. at the behest of Bank Negara Malaysia.  
 
Some ten years after the establishment of the first Islamic bank in the country (Bank 
Islam Malaysia Berhad in 1983), the creation of an Islamic Inter-bank Money Market 
(IIMM) was announced. The intervening 10 years had shown the need to have a 
Shariah-compliant money market. Until the establishment of the IIMM in January 
1994, the Islamic banking sector had to rely on a single instrument, the Government 
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Investment Certificate (GIC)2 to manage liquidity. Aside from the fact that it was the 
only available Shariah compliant instrument, there was another limitation, there was 
no secondary market for the instrument.  
The Islamic financial institutions could only deal with BNM, the central bank. They 
would buy the GICs from BNM when they have surplus liquidity, and sell them to 
BNM when in need of liquidity. For a banking sector that was fast growing, this was 
an inadequate arrangement.  Thus, the need for a full fledged Islamic Inter-bank 
Money Market (IIMM). In “designing” an Islamic monetary market, BNM had no 
existing workable model to follow. In creating its own design, the obvious choice was 
to structure a Shari’ah-compliant version of conventional money markets. Thus, the 
IIMM was created, by using a conventional money market template. While this was 
once again the path of least resistance and one that would be familiar to Malaysian 
bankers, as we shall see later it exposes the Islamic banks to certain risks, which 
paradoxically, should not exist for Islamic banks.  
Following the structure of conventional money markets, the IIMM had three 
components. A mudarabah-based inter-bank market for deposits, a platform for 
issuing and trading short-term Islamic financial instruments, and an Islamic Cheque 
Clearing System (ICCS).  
Fig. 1: Overall Structure of the IIMM 
 
                                                 
2
 The GIC has now been replaced by the GII (Government Investment Issues) 
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When placed within the country’s overall financial system, the IIMM’s role and 
connection would be as follows: 
 
Fig. 2: IIMM within the Banking / Insurance System. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 2 shows, as a result of Malaysia’s dual banking system there is an 
interesting dimension to the IIMM. Not only do Islamic banks and other Islamic 
financial institutions have access, conventional banks, insurance companies and other 
conventional NBFI’s (non-bank financial institutions) have access to the IIMM. This 
is particularly so, for the second component of IIMM, which is Islamic  money-
market instruments. While Islamic financial institutions have no access to the 
conventional money market, the opposite is not the case.  
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market instruments or selling the ones they own. They cannot issue their own Islamic 
papers into IIMM, nor bid for them in the primary market.  
In the secondary market, however, there is no differentiation. In fact, until end-2003, 
conventional banks were allowed to issue Green BAs which were essentially Islamic 
banker’s acceptances. This effectively meant that conventional banks could raise 
funds in the IIMM. The Shari’ah compatibility of the Green BAs came from the fact 
that their underlying asset was halal. Since January 2004, the practice has been 
disallowed and Green BAs have ceased to exist.  
 
The Islamic Inter-bank Market  
Before going on to discuss the instruments traded, we take a quick overview of the 
other two components of IIMM, namely the Islamic inter-bank market and the cheque   
clearing system. Of the two, the inter-bank market is by far the more important. At the 
heart of the Islamic inter-bank market is a mechanism known as the Mudarabah Inter-
bank Investment Scheme (MII). This is the mechanism by which Islamic banks can 
borrow and lend among themselves. Moreover, banks with surplus funds can invest 
with those with liquidity deficits. As the name suggests, the financing is mudarabah- 
based with a negotiated profit-sharing ratio. The minimum amount of investment in 
the MII is RM 50,000. The term of investment can vary from overnight to 12 months. 
In the early years of the Islamic Inter-bank Market, the rate of return on the MII used 
to be based on the gross profit rate on one-year investments that the receiving 
(borrowing) bank was paying to depositors.  
It soon became evident that there was an incentive problem here. It was to the 
receiving bank’s advantage to “declare” a lower profit rate. In a sense, the rates of 
return were dictated by the returns of the “inefficient” banks. To overcome this 
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problem, BNM revised the rules by setting a minimum benchmark rate for the MII.3 
With this revision, the minimum rate of return for the MII was set to equal the 
prevailing rate of the GIC (Government Investment Certificate) plus a spread of 0.5%. 
 
 
 
Pricing the Mudarabah Inter-bank Investment Funds. 
Given the above description of the MII, the pricing or cost of funds for a given 
amount and term would depend on two unknowns: 
(i) The profit-sharing ratio (PSR) which is to be negotiated.  
(ii)  The gross profit rate before distribution of the receiving bank on one-year 
investments that it will declare. This declaration will be made by the 
receiving bank at the maturity date of the MII. This means that once the 
profit-sharing ratio is agreed upon, there is only one unknown, namely the 
profit rate that will be declared by the receiving bank. However, part of 
this uncertainty is reduced in the sense that the investing bank knows that 
it will the higher of the following:  
• The prevailing rate on GIC of same term + 0.5% (annualised), if the declared 
profit rate is lower than this, or 
• The declared profit rate adjusted for PSR; if it is higher than the GIC + 0.5% 
annualised.  
The formula used in determining the (price) profit amount due to the provider of 
funds (investing bank) is as follows;4  
                                                 
3
 This revision became effective in February 1995. 
Rate of return for MII ≥ Return on GIC + 0.5% 
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36500
)(Pr KtX = ………………………………………………………………… Eq. (1) 
Where;  
X  = Ringgit (RM) amount to be paid to investing bank  
P = Face value / principal amount of investment  
t = Term in days of investment  
r = Gross profit rate before distribution declared by receiving bank on one   
year investments 
K = Profit sharing ratio. 
Appendix 1 provides an illustration of the MII mechanism and settlement.  
 
The Islamic Inter-bank Cheque Clearing System (IICCS)  
 In addressing the need to establish a separate cheque clearing system for the 
Islamic banking sector, BNM undertook two initiatives. First, it required all Islamic 
banks to maintain an Al-Wadiah based (safe-custody basis) current account with 
BNM. Second, it required the same Islamic banks to empower it to square off the 
funding position, between surplus and deficit banks, during the automatic cheque 
clearing process at midnight. The empowerment by the banks to BNM is based on the   
Al-Wakalah concept. The surplus funds of an Islamic bank are placed with other 
Islamic banks which might have a deficit.5  
Once again, the placement of funds from a surplus bank to a deficit one is done on the 
Mudarabah concept, as in the case of MII. However, in this case the profit-sharing 
ratio is fixed at 70:30. The same formula as in Eq. (1) above is used in determining 
                                                                                                                                            
4
 Note: the 36500 in the denominator is 365 days X 100. Thus, in the numerator the percent ‘r’ will be 
entered as a whole number and not as decimal.  
5
 When the total surplus and deficits are not equal, a weighted average method is used in allocating 
funds.  
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the profit to be paid by the deficit units. The Islamic Inter-bank Cheque Clearing 
System is really a sub-segment of the overall cheque clearing system handled by the 
KLACH (Kuala Lumpur Automated Clearing House).  
Islamic Money Market Instruments 
In developing the Islamic money market, BNM had introduced a series of Shari’ah- 
compliant money market instruments. In doing so, the basic strategy was also one of 
replication. Recall that replication was also the strategy used in introducing Islamic 
banking. Extending this strategy to money market instruments, common-money 
market instruments were “Islamised” by removing the interest-bearing feature and 
replacing it with either a profit rate or a mark-up feature. Thus, where there were 
Banker’s Acceptances, we have Islamic BAs, Negotiable Instruments of Deposits 
(NIDs) were replicated as Negotiable Islamic Instruments of Deposit (NIIDs), 
Malaysian Treasury Bills became Malaysian Islamic Treasury Bills and so on.  
 
Depending on when the observation is made, there could be 8 to 10 different types of 
instruments available for trading in the IIMM. The number of instruments varies since 
some instruments may only be issued intermittently. Appendix 2 describes some of 
the more popular instruments and their underlying Islamic contracts. Mudarabah 
based bonds and Ijarah based Sukuks are also available. The Bai Al Dayn or debt 
trading concept is applicable to instruments such as Islamic Accepted Bills (IABs). 
Given the controversy surrounding the acceptability of Bay Al dayn, it is not as 
popular as it once was. Qard Al-Hasan which used to be the mode underlying the 
GICs and later the GIIs, appears to have fizzled out. Given the uncertainty of the 
redeemable face value under the Qard-Al-Hassan concept, it was not suited for a 
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secondary market traded instrument. Thus, the GII is now issued under the Bai Al-
Inah concept, while secondary market trading of these papers is based on Al-Dayn.  
 
Perhaps in response to rising wariness and some unease about trading financial 
papers, BNM has recently launched with much fanfare, a Commodity Murabaha 
contract. Based on crude palm oil (CPO), this commodity murabaha contract is 
intended to be a liquidity management tool (See description in Appendix 2). The only 
contract that continues to use the Qard-Al-Hasan concept is the Rahnu Agreement 
(RA-i). This however is a collateralized facility which is only available with BNM. 
 
Aside from replicating conventional instruments, a number of trading 
methods/processes have also been adopted from conventional money markets. The 
best example being, the replication of the highly popular Repurchase Agreements 
(REPOs) as the Sell and Buy Back Agreement (SBBA). Under the SBBA, following 
the initial sale at a negotiated price, the parties enter into a separate agreement to 
reverse the trade at a newly negotiated price.  
 
Pricing of Islamic Money Market Instruments 
 As IIMM’s instruments and processes have largely been structured using the 
conventional template, the pricing of these instruments by and large, follow the 
conventional logic of discounting. The key difference being that, whereas the 
prevailing interest rate of appropriate term to maturity is used in conventional pricing, 
the profit-rate or mark-up rate is used in discounting Islamic instruments. In fact, even 
the Ar-Rahnu (RA-i) facility described earlier as being based on the Qard-Al-Hasan 
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concept provides a hibah (gift) which is determined based on average Islamic 
interbank rates of return 
 If product design, trading processes and pricing methods have all been 
synthesized from conventional forms, it raises the question of, how different then is 
the Islamic money market from its conventional counterpart? In so far as the objective 
of providing the Islamic banking sector with a proper avenue for liquidity 
management is concerned, the IIMM has undoubtedly succeeded. However, as will be 
argued in the next section, as a result of such replication, a number of risks and issues 
arise that could accentuate the vulnerability of Islamic banks-particularly in the 
Malaysian dual banking context. 
 
IIMM and Dual Banking; Issues of Risk 
The money market, as is the case with any financial market or instrument, has a 
number of associated risks. Where the conventional money market is concerned, most 
previous literature identify four key risk categories. These are (i) Counterparty risk 
(ii) Liquidity risk (iii) Interest rate risk and (iv) Regulatory risk. Of these, liquidity 
and interest rate risk are typically the most important. Obiyathulla (2004a) examines 
the relevance of interest rate risk to the Malaysian Islamic banking sector. Based on 
the correlation between rates of return of Islamic banks and the 3 month interest rates 
of conventional banks, the paper argues that there is extensive interest rate exposure 
for the Malaysian Islamic banking sector. Deposit formation across the two banking 
sectors was also strongly linked. The free flow of funds between the two banking 
sectors and the large pool of non-Islamic clients that Islamic banks have, would 
ensure arbitrage flows if rates were different between the sectors. As a result, not only 
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were the rates similar across both banking sectors, they were also very closely 
correlated.  
If Islamic banks operating within a dual banking system can have interest rate 
exposure through cross deposits, is interest rate risk relevant when we have an IIMM 
operating within such a system? This is an empirical question which we will address 
in the following section. The other risks associated with conventional money markets, 
counterparty risk, liquidity risk and regulatory risk are obviously also applicable to an 
IIMM. However, there are may be two additional risks unique to Islamic money 
markets. These are Accounting Risks and Shari’ah Risk. 
   
Accounting risks in this context refers to the risk that the borrower in a profit-sharing 
relationship might understate profits. Instruments based on Mudarabah and 
Musyarakah type contracts would be susceptible to such risk. While one might think 
that such a risk would be substantially less for money market instruments given their 
short-term nature, accounting risk is highly relevant. A good example would be the 
new policy that BNM had to introduce, precisely to overcome the problem of 
“understated” profits with the Mudarabah Inter bank Investments (MII). In February 
1994, about a year after the establishment of the IIMM, BNM had to introduce a 
minimum required return on MII equivalent to prevailing GII +0.5% (annualised). 
This move was necessitated by fact that “there was exploitation by the inefficient 
banks.”6 Though the PSR is dictated by the investing bank, the profit rate declared at 
maturity is determined by the receiving bank. The receiving banks were understating 
profits leading to possible disintermediation of the process. Thus, the need to impose 
a minimum required rate of return.  
                                                 
6
 See: The Central Bank and the Financial System in Malaysia, A decade of change BNM (40th 
Anniversary Issue) pg 248. 
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Shari’ah Risk, a counterpart of regulatory risk, it refers to the possibility that 
transactions/instruments currently deemed acceptable could subsequently be 
prohibited. Some examples of this type of risk would be (i) the issue of mark-ups in 
Pakistan and (ii) the controversy surrounding Bai Al-Dayn based transactions. Bai Al-
Dayn transactions certainly appear to be reducing in Malaysia. Of late, even the 
highly popular BBA based contracts in Malaysia are being questioned. The fact that 
Green BA’s, once a popularly traded instrument on the IIMM have now completely 
stopped is a good example of such risk.  
Of the risks discussed thus far, Interest Rate Risk is probably the most critical where 
money market instruments are concerned. From a conventional viewpoint, a key role 
of money markets is price-discovery. Essentially, the formation of short-term interest 
rates and thereby, the short-end of the yield curve. Since money market trading is 
designed to be reflective of rate movements, conventional money market instruments 
are highly rate sensitive. Additionally, since central banks typically use the money 
market to execute monetary policy, the money market would usually be the first to 
react to rate or liquidity changes.  Interest rate risk manifests itself in several ways. 
The three key forms being:  
i) Prepayment risk   
ii) Reinvestment risk and  
iii) Re-pricing risk 
 
Given the short-term nature of money market instruments, prepayment risk is a non-
issue. Though reinvestment risk is relevant, re pricing risk is by far the most important 
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for money market instruments. Given the discounted form of their pricing, rate 
movements would have a highly significant and direct impact. 
 
Relative yields and Correlation, Evidence from Malaysia’s Conventional Money 
Market and the IIMM.  
Are such interest rate risks relevant for the IIMM? The raison d’etare of an Islamic 
Inter bank Money Market is to enable interest free trading. Yet, as we saw in earlier 
sections, an IIMM operating within a dual banking system has extensive linkages and 
cross linkages with the conventional banking/financial sector. Given these realities, it 
is only logical that activities in the IIMM cannot be completely detached from the rest 
of the system. Arbitrage flows would work their way into or out of the IIMM through 
any of the several linking channels. Since the IIMM replicates of the conventional 
system, both in terms of trading processes and instruments, any yield differences 
between the IIMM and the rest of the system would constitute a pure arbitrage 
opportunity. As such, a well functioning IIMM operating within a dual system would 
inevitably have yields/profit rates that closely resemble the yields and interest rates in 
the conventional system. Such synchronicity however, has a huge implication about 
the relevance of interest rate risk to a supposedly “interest-free” market.  
 
To examine this relevance, an empirical study of the daily quoted yields in Malaysia’s 
IIMM and the conventional money market was undertaken. Specifically, a total of 
four inter bank yields were examined. These were the daily quotes for the (i) 
overnight, (ii) 1 week, (iii) 1 month and (iv) 3 month inter bank transactions. The 
conventional yields are the KLIBOR rates of respective terms whereas for the IIMM, 
it is the KLIRR (Kuala Lumpur Islamic Reference Rates) of respective maturity. 
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Daily data from October 1998 to end April 2007, a period of slightly more than 8.5 
years is used. This constituted a total of 2,328 daily observations7 for the 4 pairs of 
yields (8 different daily rates). The conventional money market data was sourced 
from BNM’s website while IIMM data from the IIMM website. Following 
Obiyathulla (2004), linkage between the two money markets is examined in two 
ways. First, by doing a Pearson Pairwise Correlation and second by estimating the 
following OLS regression equation; 
 
 IIR = λ + β . CIR + e .      ..………………………………………….(2) 
 
Where:  IRR  = Islamic Inter-bank Rate  
  CIR  = Conventional Inter-bank Rate 
 
 The above equation will be estimated 4 times in each case using the overnight, 
one week, one month and 3 month rates. Since the null hypothesis tested would be 
that β = 0, a statistically significant positive value of the Beta Coefficient would imply 
high correlation between the rates. To see if a causal relationship might exist, the 
Granger Causality test (2 lags) is used. 
 
Results   
Figures 3 to 6 show the plot of the Islamic and conventional rate for overnight, 1 
week, 1 month and 3 month inter-bank deposits. The similarity in rates and their co- 
movement is obvious in each and every case. Over the 8.5 year study period, there 
appears to have been four interest rate regimes. First, a period of sharply declining 
                                                 
7
 In some of the sub periods there was missing IIMM data. In such case both observations for the day 
were dropped. 
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rates followed by a second period of stable interest rates.  This is then followed by a 
third period of steadily rising rates. The final forth period of about one year, again has 
stable rates. These four sub periods have been demarcated on the graphs. The co-
movement of both the conventional and Islamic rates are apparent regardless of the 
interest rate environment. Table 1 below shows the results of our Pearson Pair-wise 
Correlation test. 
Table 1: Results of Pearson Pair-wise Correlation for Overall Period 
 
Table 1(a) in Appendix shows the correlation by sub-periods. It is obvious from these 
results that despite being two separate markets, each supposedly with its own “price-
discovery” process, the yields across both markets are strongly linked. These linkages 
are further confirmed by the results of the OLS regression. Table 2 below is a 
summary of the results. 
 
Table 2: Summary Results of Regression Analysis  
Rate No. of 
Obs. 
Beta 
Coeff. 
t-stat Prob. R2 
(i) Overnight  
(ii) 1 Week 
(iii) 1 Month  
(iv) 3 Month 
2328 
2327 
2328 
2328 
0.7627 
0.7849 
0.8202 
0.8038 
145.21 
212.46 
185.87 
126.22 
0.00* 
0.00* 
0.00* 
0.00* 
0.90 
0.95 
0.94 
0.87 
The results are based on Regression Equation 2. 
 
  Paired Rates Correlation Coefficient  
(i)   Overnight 0.949027 
(ii)  1 week 0.975201 
(iii) 1 month 0.967945 
(iv) 3 month 0.934128   
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In all cases, the null hypothesis that β = 0 which would imply that rate formation is 
different in both markets is strongly rejected. The fact that beta is positive also tells us 
that changes in both the Islamic and conventional money markets   are unidirectional.  
 While both the above results confirm the existence of very strong correlation 
between Islamic and conventional money market rates, they do no necessarily prove 
causality. To test for causality, the Granger Causality tests (2 lags) were conducted. 
The results for the 4 pairs are shown in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3:  Results of Granger Causality Tests 
(Full sample; Overall period) 
  
 
 
  Null Hypothesis: 
 
Overnight Rates 
No. 
Obs. 
F-stat.      Prob. 
 
 
 
  COR does not Granger Cause IOR 2326  67.2671  0.00000 
  IOR does not Granger Cause COR  47.2928  0.00000 
 
One Week Rates 
 
  C1WR does not Granger Cause I1WR 2323  85.2958  0.00000 
  I1WR does not Granger Cause C1WR  1.19066  0.30421 
   
One Month Rates 
 
  C1MR does not Granger Cause I1MR 2326  37.8933  0.00000 
  I1MR does not Granger Cause C1MR  12.4855  4.0E-06 
 
 
Three Month Rates 
 
  C3MR does not Granger Cause I3MR 2326  12.0418  6.3E-06 
  I3MR does not Granger Cause C3MR  8.16969  0.00029 
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In all four cases, as Table 3 shows, the hypothesis that the conventional rate does not 
Granger Cause the equivalent IIMM rate is rejected. With the exception of the one 
week rates, there is a feedback relationship in the other three rates. 
These results are very much in line with the results of Obiyathulla (2004a). That study 
examined two variables, the 3 month interest rate offered by conventional banks with 
3 month profit rates offered by Islamic banks and Total Deposit rates in the two 
banking sectors. Using monthly data over a 10 year period, the study found very 
strong correlation across both sectors for both interest / profit rates and deposits. 
Granger-Causality analysis showed strong one way causation from the conventional 
banking sector to the Islamic banking sector. 
 It appears therefore, that, as was the case for the banking sector, our analysis 
of money markets here, also shows strikingly similar results. Despite each sector, 
conventional and Islamic, having its own infrastructure, different sets of instruments, 
different regulatory structures and different philosophical frameworks, the end results 
appear the same. So what do these results imply for the Islamic banks, which are the 
main users of the IIMM?  
 
Conclusion: Implications and Challenges  
Islamic money market yields that move in sync with conventional rates simply means 
that, users of an IIMM would face the same extent of interest rate risk that 
conventional players do. It is indeed ironical that despite creating new markets and 
institutions that are supposed to enable interest free operations, players end up with as 
much interest rate exposure if not more. This, unfortunately is the reality of IIMMs 
operating within a dual banking system. Just as water cannot be at two levels within 
the same container, an Islamic financial system operating within a larger conventional 
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macro environment cannot completely sterilize itself from interest rate risks. If a 
common customer pool that can freely move funds between banking systems is the 
explanation for interest rate risk transmission to Islamic banks. The results of this 
study imply that the existence of an IIMM may actually enhance this transmission. 
There are at least 3 additional channels of transmission with an IIMM. These are; (i) 
through the pricing in inter bank rates, (ii) through the pricing of Islamic money 
market instruments and (iii) through the central bank’s money market operations.  
 
Given the very strong correlation we have seen between the inter-bank rates, changes 
in interest rates in the conventional money market would simply be transmitted to 
Islamic banks when they use the IIMM for their liquidity management. Similarly, 
since IIMM instruments are priced using discounting, interest rate changes cause re 
pricing risk because discount rates change. Prices and yields of IIMM instruments 
will invariably converge with those of conventional money markets because of the 
possibility for pure arbitrage. As such, Islamic institutions issuing IIMM instruments 
will face higher cost if conventional interest rates rise, while investors of IIMM 
instruments would get lower returns if the opposite happens. The third transmission 
channel arises from central bank intervention. Regardless of whether the intervention 
is a routine open market operation to influence liquidity or execution of new monetary 
policy, the central bank’s actions in the IIMM must reflect its actions in the 
conventional money market. Failing which, profitable arbitrage against the central 
bank or a carry trade between the markets would both be feasible. Given this, no 
matter how supportive a central bank is of the Islamic financial sector, it cannot 
possibly maintain dual rates nor cause changes in one market and not in the other. 
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Thus, Central Bank actions would constitute another channel/means of interest rate 
risk transmission.   
 
Paradoxical as it may seem, the implication is that  an IIMM could bring the Islamic 
banking sector into closer orbit with the conventional sector. Does this mean that not 
having an IIMM is better in a dual banking system? Obviously not. While an IIMM 
may provide additional channels for rate risk transmission, as we saw in the first 
section, it nevertheless plays several pivotal roles, liquidity management being the 
most important. The challenge then is to have well functioning IIMMs that do not 
pass on rate risks. One tempting solution is to detach the Islamic financial system 
form the conventional one and keep it truly separate by not allowing transactions 
across markets. Not only would this not be feasible, it would also be hugely 
distortionary and very costly to maintain. Unless the Islamic financial sector is to be 
kept as a small niche, it would simply not be possible to keep it totally detached. For 
countries like Malaysia and most GCC countries which are trading nations locked into 
the global economic system, this is not an option. 
 
Rather than aiming to detach the Islamic financial system from the conventional, a 
more realistic and workable approach, may be one of reducing the reliance. That is, an 
incremental approach that reduces the reliance that IIMMs now have on the 
conventional money markets. Since such reliance is currently domestic in nature, 
resulting in “one prevailing interest rate / cost of capital” across both Islamic and 
conventional sectors, some de-linking may be achieved by linking IIMMs across 
borders. In essence making an IIMM in one country more dependent on an IIMM 
across borders rather than on its domestic conventional counterpart. A large part of 
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the current dependence on conventional money markets is due to the smallness of 
IIMMs, their lack of instruments, shallow liquidity etc. Linking them across borders 
eliminates many of these problems. Risk will be dissipated and not concentrated on 
small national IIMMs. The benefits would be akin to that of the insurance industry, 
where “domestic” risk is internationalised through reinsurance across borders  
 
Attempting to link IIMMs across countries would obviously raise its own set of 
problems. Issues of regulatory regimes, taxes, exchange controls, currency risks, etc 
would arise. However, linking IIMMs across countries need not necessarily be a 
totally new phenomenon. There is precedence, the Euromarkets. The Eurocurrency 
markets are really an ‘offshore’ version of the domestic money markets of the US, 
UK, Japan etc. An internationally linked network of IIMMs could bring about many 
of the benefits, particularly in the areas of risk management that the Euromarkets have 
brought. Yet, the Euromarkets were not created by design but came about 
spontaneously to fulfill latent demands. There is much that we can learn from the 
experience of the Euromarkets as we seek to develop and enhance Islamic money 
markets   
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Table 1 (A) 
Pearson Pair-wise Correlation by Sub Period 8 
(1) Sub Period 1: (12 October 1998 
– 30 March 1999)
IOR                      COR           
IOR 1.000000 -0.045273
COR -0.045273 1.000000
I1WR C1WR 
I1WR 1.000000 0.384106
C1WR 0.384106 1.000000
I1MR                   C1MR
I1MR 1.000000 0.634571
C1MR 0.634571 1.000000
I3MR    C3MR
I3MR 1.000000 0.535968
C3MR 0.535968 1.000000
(2) Sub Period 2: (1 April 1999 – 30 
November 2005)
IOR                      COR
IOR 1.000000 0.688294
COR 0.688294 1.000000
I1WR C1WR
I1WR 1.000000 0.822603
C1WR 0.822603 1.000000
I1MR C1MR
I1MR 1.000000 0.740138
C1MR 0.740138 1.000000
I3MR      C3MR
I3MR 1.000000 0.769780
C3MR 0.769780 1.000000
 
 
 
(3) Sub Period 3: 1912 – 2008 (1 
December 2005 - 26 April 2006)
IOR COR
IOR 1.000000 0.834129
COR 0.834129 1.000000
I1WR C1WR
I1WR 1.000000 0.898732
C1WR 0.898732 1.000000
I1MR C1MR
I1MR 1.000000 0.718625
C1MR 0.718625 1.000000
I3MR C3MR
I3MR 1.000000 0.498147
C3MR 0.498147 1.000000
(4) Sub Period 4: 2009 – 2328 (27 
April 2006 – 30 April 2007)
IOR COR
IOR 1.000000 0.386192
COR 0.386192 1.000000
I1WR C1WR
I1WR 1.000000 -0.256179
C1WR -0.256179 1.000000
I1MR C1MR
I1MR 1.000000 0.218406
C1MR 0.218406 1.000000
I3MR C3MR
I3MR 1.000000 -0.720529
C3MR -0.720529 1.000000
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The four sub periods of different interest rate regimes are demarcated in graphs, Figs. 3-6 
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Appendix 1 
 
Settlement of MII at Maturity – Illustration  
 To see how an MII transaction would be settled at maturity, we work through 
a simple example. Suppose, Ambank Islamic has a surplus of RM 5 million that it 
wishes place out for 3 months in the Islamic Interbank Market. Bank Muamalat on the 
other hand is in need of liquidity. Assume it needs RM 5 million of funds for 3 
months. Since the quantum and tenor of funds is dictated by their needs, the only 
thing that has by to be negotiated is the profit-sharing ratio (PSR). Let us say they 
agree on a PSR of 75:25. That is Ambank, which is the investing bank will receive 
75% of Bank Muamalat’s declared gross profit before distribution on year investment 
(deposits) that it has had.   
 Based on this agreement, Ambank Islamic will place a RM 5 million deposit 
with Bank Muamalat. 90 days later, the receiving bank, Bank Muamalat will have to 
return the principal of RM 5 million plus a profit amount. This profit amount will 
depend on the one remaining unknown which is Bank Muamalat’s declared gross 
profit on one year investments. If this profit is higher than the prevailing GIC rate + 
0.5% than the declared profit percentage will be used in Eq.1 to determine the profit 
compensation to Ambank. If on the other hand the declared gross profit of Bank 
Muamalat on 1 year investments is lower than the GIC rate + 0.5% annualised, than 
Ambank profit amount will be determined by the latter percentage.  
 Let us say, Bank Muamalat declares a gross profit of 6% before distribution on 
its one year investments. Assuming this is higher than the prevailing GIC rate + 0.5%, 
the profit amount to be paid by the receiving bank to the investing bank Ambank 
Islamic would be;  
 
36500
]75)][.90%)(6(000,000,5[RMX =
  
 = 
36500
]75[.000,000,700,2 x
 
  = 
36500
000,000,025,2
 
 
  = RM 55,479.45 
So, on day 91, Bank Muamalat would have to return an amount of RM 5,055,479.45 
to Ambank Islamic, being the principal plus profit due.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Common IIMM instruments and their underlying Islamic contracts. 
i)  Government Investment Issue (GII)     
To meet the need for a liquidity management instrument that is also shari’ah 
compliant,   the Malaysian Parliament passed the Government Investment Act in 
1983. This act, enabled the Malaysian government  to issue  a non-interest bearing 
money market instrument, known as Government Investment Certificates (GIC) {now 
replaced with Government Investment Issues (GII)}. The GII was introduced in July 
1983 under the concept of Qard al- Hasan. 
Since a Qard al- Hasan, based instrument would not have a predetermined fixed “face 
value” at maturity, it would not be suited for  secondary market trading . Thus, 
beginning with a 15 June 2001, issue, GII’s are now issued  under a new concept of of 
Bai Al-Inah. This, added depth and liquidity  to the IIMM as the GII is now tradable 
in the secondary market via the concept of Bay ad- Dayn (debt trading). 
ii) Bank Negara Negotiable Notes (BNNN)      
Bank Negara Negotiable Notes (BNNN) are  a short-term, money market instrument 
issued by BNM. The underlying contract is that of  Bai Al Inah. First introduced to 
the IIMM on 29 November 2000,  It is now popularly traded  in the secondary market. 
The price of the BNNN is determined on a discounted basis. Tenor is typically  up to 
one year. The BNNN is designed as a liquidity management tool . 
iii)  Cagamas Mudharabah Bonds (Sukuk Mudarabah Cagamas)      
The Cagamas Mudharabah  Bond, was introduced in  March 1994 by Cagamas 
Berhad, the National Mortgage Corporation,  to finance the purchase of Islamic 
housing debts from financial institutions. As the name suggests, the bond is structured 
using the concept of Mudharabah. Bondholders and Cagamas will share the profits 
accrued according to the predetermined profit-sharing ratios. 
iv)  Islamic Accepted Bills (IAB)     
The Islamic Accepted Bill (IAB), was introduced in 1991. The objective was to 
provide a shari’ah compliant instrument to conventional BAs, particularly for trade 
financing . The IAB is formulated on the Islamic principles of Al-Murabahah 
(deferred lump-sum sale or cost-plus). The secondary market trading of the instrument 
is based on  Bai ad-Dayn (debt-trading). 
Murabahah is based on a cost-plus profit margin or mark up  agreed to by both 
parties. Bai Al-Dayn refers to the sale of a debt arising from a trade transaction in the 
form of a deferred payment sale. There are two types of financing under the IAB 
facility, namely:-  
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• Trade Financing/ Imports  
A Murabahah based , working capital financing mechanism. The  Islamic bank 
appoints the customer as its purchasing agent for the underlying goods. As agent, 
the customer purchases the needed goods from the seller (foreign exporter) on 
behalf of the bank,  which pays  the seller /exporter and resells  the goods to the 
customer at a marked up price. The customer is typically allowed a deferred 
payment of up to 200 days. Since, the sale of goods by the bank to the customer 
on deferred payment constitutes  a debt, the debt  is securitised in the form of a 
bill of exchange drawn by the bank on and the customer for the full amount of the  
selling price.  The bank can then decide  to sell the IAB to a third party on a   Bai 
al-dayn  basis.  
 
• Trade Financing/ Exports  
 An exporter, with an approved IAB facility,  prepares  the export documentation 
as required under the sale contract or letter of credit. The export documents, shall 
be sent to the importer's bank. The exporter then  draws  on the foreign 
commercial bank a new bill of exchange as a substitute  bill and this will be the 
IAB. The bank shall purchase the IAB at a mutually agreed price using the 
concept of Bai al-Dayn and the proceeds will be credited to the exporter's account.  
 
v) Islamic Negotiable Instruments (INI)    
These negotiable instruments come in two varieties;   
Islamic Negotiable Instruments of Deposit (INID) 
Based on the concept of Al-Mudharabah. The underlying asset is usually  a sum of 
money deposited with an  Islamic banking institution.and repayable to the bearer on a 
specified future date.   
ii) Negotiable Islamic Debt Certificate (NIDC) 
Involves two steps, first, the sale of an Islamic bank’s assets to a customer at an 
agreed cash price. In the second step, the customer resells the asset to the bank at 
original sale price plus a profit. The bank will pay the customer this new amount at an 
agreed future date. 
vi) Islamic Private Debt Securities     
Islamic Private Debt Securities (IPDS) are essentially shari'ahcompliant Corporate 
bonds. Introduced in 1990, they form the backbone of the Malaysian Islamic Bond 
market. Most of the  IPDS currently outstanding, were issued based on concepts of 
Bai Bithaman Ajil, Murabahah , al Mudharabah and increasingly al ijarah. 
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vii) Sell and Buy Back Agreement (SBBA)      
Essentially a replication of the conventional REPO, the Sell and Buy Back Agreement 
(SBBA) is an Islamic money market transaction.  A bilateral agreement  in which an 
SBBA seller (seller) , first sells assets to an SBBA buyer (Buyer) at an agreed price. 
Subsequently, both parties enter  into a separate agreement in which the buyer 
promises to sell back the asset to the seller at an agreed price. 
viii) The Commodity Murabahah Program (CMP) 
The Commodity Murabahah Program  (CMP) is the most recent introduction to the 
Malaysian IIMM.  Introduced in March 2007, it is a commodity based liquidity 
management tool. The underlying commodity is Crude Palm Oil (CPO) .  Under the 
program, an Islamic bank purchases CPO from a broker and sells it to BNM at cost-
plus. BNM agrees to pay the bank the said amount on a deferred basis and appoints 
the bank as its agent to sell the commodity. The bank then sells the commodity to 
another broker and credits the amount to BNM.  What has effectively happened is 
that, as a result of this transaction, the bank has placed out its excess funds with 
BNM. The same transaction can be done in reverse if a bank is short of funds and 
needs liquidity. The CMP however, is not currently available in the secondary market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
